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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-3183 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 ERIC C. NORTON, 
                                    Appellant 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. No. 4-07-cr-00075-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 16, 2015 
____________ 
 
Before: HARDIMAN, SCIRICA and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 13, 2015) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 Eric C. Norton appeals from a judgment revoking his supervised release; 
sentencing him to six months’ incarceration, which term he has served; and reimposing a 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.   
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lifetime term of supervised release. Norton’s primary argument is that his right to 
confrontation was violated when, at the revocation hearing, the District Court relied on 
unreliable hearsay evidence. We will affirm.  
I. 
 In January 2008, after pleading guilty to possession of child pornography, Norton 
was sentenced to 78 months’ incarceration, followed by lifetime supervised release. In 
addition to the standard conditions of supervision, Norton was subject to nine additional 
conditions. The special condition relevant to this appeal provided that Norton  
shall participate, at [his] expense, in a sex offender treatment program, 
which may include risk assessment testing, counseling and therapeutic 
polygraph examinations, and shall comply with all requirements of the 
treatment provider. The treatment is to be conducted by a therapist 
approved by the probation officer. 
 
(App. 103.)   
 Norton was released from prison in October 2012 and began a treatment program 
in May 2013, attending 45 counseling sessions with John Youngman, a licensed clinical 
social worker, between May 2013 and April 2014. In connection with this treatment, 
Norton underwent the first of two polygraph examinations on December 2, 2013. The 
polygraph examiner’s report indicated “[s]ignificant [r]eactions” to certain questions 
relating to past victims. (App. 95.) The report recommended that Norton be given another 
exam in several months “assuming that YOUNGMAN was able to break down 
[Norton’s] denials regarding past victim(s).” (Id.) Further, the examiner wrote, “a 
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maintenance/monitoring exam should be given in approx. 6 months to assist [Mark] 
KEHLER [Norton’s probation officer], unless of course something else arises.” (Id.) The 
District Court was informed of the results on January 28, 2014, and permitted Norton to 
continue under supervision “pending further treatment and a second polygraph 
examination.” (App. 7.) 
 Norton was tested again on March 20, 2014. The examiner’s report states that he 
“could not determine the result of the examinee’s polygraph charts” because “the 
examinee employed Countermeasures/being Purposely Non-Cooperative (PNC) during 
his entire exam.” (App. 97.) The examiner suggested that Probation Officer Kehler “may 
want to [be] more vigilant” with Norton, and that Youngman “may have to determine 
whether or not to continue with treatment . . . because [Norton] is being non-compliant 
with his therapy ([he] is not being honest about his past & therefore unmanageable).” 
(App. 98.) Both polygraphs were administered by a Pennsylvania state trooper who was 
working as an independent contractor for purposes of the polygraph examinations here.  
 On April 30, 2014, Youngman sent Kehler a letter indicating that while Norton 
was “generally compliant and engaging” in their sessions and had shown “improved 
insight into the dynamics of his past sexual offending,” he also had “demonstrated non-
compliance w[ith] directives and probable deceptive responses during his two polygraph 
examinations.” (App. 92.) Youngman wrote that he had been unsuccessful in convincing 
Norton to be more transparent, and was discharging Norton because he “failed to 
adequately manage his risk factors for re-offense.” (Id.) 
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 On May 9, 2014, a petition to revoke Norton’s supervised release on the ground 
that he violated a condition of that release was filed. Norton contested the charged 
violation, and the District Court held a revocation hearing on June 17, 2014. The 
Government relied on the polygraph reports and Youngman’s letter. Norton called Kehler 
to testify. The Court found that Norton had violated the condition at issue, sentenced him 
to six months’ incarceration, and reimposed lifetime supervised release. Norton timely 
appealed.  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 18 U.S.C.  
§ 3583(e)(3). Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), supervised release may be revoked if a 
district court “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a 
condition of supervised release.” The Government has the burden of proof. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742. “The District Court’s decision 
to revoke supervised release is reviewed for abuse of discretion,” while the “factual 
findings supporting that decision are reviewed for clear error” and “legal issues are 
subject to de novo review.” United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2008). 
III. 
 Norton contends that by permitting the Government to meet its burden at the 
hearing with “unreliable hearsay evidence,” his right to confrontation was violated.1 
                                                 
1 Before the District Court and before us, Norton incorrectly identified the source of his 
claimed right to confrontation as the Sixth Amendment, rather than the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  
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(Appellant’s Br. 10.) The Government counters that the Court “properly deemed reliable 
the Youngman Letter and Polygraph Reports because they were detailed, were written by 
people who did not have adversarial relationships with Norton, did not contain multiple 
levels of hearsay, and were corroborated by the independent testimony of Kehler.” (Gov’t 
Br. 10.) 
 As the parties recognize, hearsay evidence can be used to support a revocation of 
supervised release. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3); United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341, 343 
(3d Cir. 2009). A releasee does, however, retain a limited right of confrontation at the 
revocation hearing as a matter of due process. Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 343. Fed. R. Crim. P. 
32.1(b)(2)(C), embodying this principle, provides that the releasee is entitled to “an 
opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question any adverse witness unless the 
court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.” In 
applying Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C), a district court must balance the releasee’s interest in his 
right of confrontation against the Government’s reason for denying it. Lloyd, 566 F.3d at 
344-45.  
 It is difficult to see how any right of confrontation enjoyed by Norton was violated 
and, more specifically, how he was denied the “opportunity to . . . question any adverse 
witness.” When, on Norton’s behalf, his attorney invoked that right, the District Court 
responded that he could subpoena Youngman and the polygraph examiner, the witnesses 
Norton claims he needed to call, and the Court could evaluate that testimony. (App. 22.) 
Indeed, the Government had earlier stated that “If [Norton] prefers to have an 
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adjournment to bring these witnesses in, we would have no objection to that . . . .” (Id. at 
19.) Norton did not seek an adjournment, and, although he called Kehler to testify, he 
made no effort to subpoena any other witness. He surely had the “opportunity” to do so. 
That forfeited opportunity clearly undermined Norton’s asserted interest in 
“confrontation” and enabled the District Court to strike the balance it did in favor of the 
reliability of the relatively detailed polygraph reports and the Youngman letter.  
IV. 
 The order of the District Court will be affirmed.2 
                                                 
2 We have reviewed Norton’s subsidiary arguments and reject them. In brief, the 
condition Norton was found to have violated was not vague and the discretion of the 
probation officer was appropriately limited thereunder. Moreover, the revocation was 
based not on the results of the polygraphs, but on Norton’s violation of the condition that 
he participate in treatment and comply with the provider’s requirements.  
